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• How do we coordinate shared print archiving
nationally and internationally?
• What existing models outside librarianship
and higher education might inform the
development of the social and technical
infrastructure?
• What voices outside librarianship need to be
heard and what ideas and concerns need to be
grappled with as we systematically and strategically (or not!) “drawdown” “redundant”
library holdings?

Curating Collective Collections
from page 77
are published, for example public library
materials such as self-help books, popular
fiction and biography, etiquette, and other
genres that later become invaluable sources
for cultural historians.
• What if we start down this road but find
part-way there that the political will and/or
financial resources necessary to do the job
well are not forthcoming?

Invitation to Participate

Other Big Questions
Another facet of Curating the Collective Collection will be thoughtful essays wrestling in a public forum with some of the larger questions attendant
to this remarkable conceptual and operational shift
from managing individual institutional collections to
reliance on a cooperatively curated, shared national
collection. Some of obvious questions include:
• What is the political economy of a national
shared collection? Who will own and have
access to materials? What are the long range
cost and power implications of the structures
we establish for sharing? Who might be left
out? Will shared print archiving ameliorate
or exacerbate inequitable access to scholarly
materials?
• How can we build sustainable trust networks
that will endure for generations?

While those already active in shared print archiving will read and contribute to this column, a
primary purpose is to engage a broader spectrum
of librarians in thinking about and discussing
these issues. You are invited to help shape this
column by:
• Offering opinions, ask questions and suggest topics for articles. Remember, please
send me a note now suggesting three topics you’d like to see covered in the year
ahead.
• Proposing to write or co-author articles on
relevant issues about which you are passionate and knowledgeable.
• Commenting on and contributing to a possible Curating the Collective Collection
blog.
Stay tuned and be in touch!
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Collecting to the Core — Financial Crises
by Peter Z. McKay (Business Librarian, University of Florida Libraries; Economics Subject Editor,
Resources for College Libraries) <pzmckay@uflib.ufl.edu>
Column Editor: Anne Doherty (Resources for College Libraries Project Editor, CHOICE/ACRL)
<adoherty@ala-choice.org>
Column Editor’s Note: The “Collecting to the Core” column highlights monographic
works that are essential to the academic library within a particular discipline, inspired by
the Resources for College Libraries bibliography (online at http://www.rclweb.net). In each
essay, subject specialists introduce and explain the classic titles and topics that continue to
remain relevant to the undergraduate curriculum and library collection. Disciplinary trends
may shift, but some classics never go out of style. — AD

“Money will not manage itself, and Lombard Street has a great deal of
money to manage.” — Walter Bagehot, Lombard Street1

I

n 1873 the British journalist, political commentator, and economist Walter Bagehot,
the long-time editor of The Economist,
published Lombard Street: A Description of
the Money Market.2 At the time, London was
the financial capital of the world and Lombard
Street — home to the Bank of England, private
banking houses, joint stock banks, and bill brokers — was the epicenter of finance, much like
today’s Wall Street. Bagehot’s book was based
on a series of essays published in The Economist
beginning in the 1850s. In addition to a lively
portrait of the contemporary money market
and leading personalities in mid-nineteenth
century London, the book forcefully argued that
the Bank of England must play the key role of
lender of last resort in stemming a banking panic. Today, Lombard Street is widely regarded

as the original crisis management manual for
central banks. This essay discusses some of the
fundamental works covering modern financial
crises, from nineteenth-century Lombard Street
to twenty-first century Wall Street.
Founded in 1694 to finance the War of the
League of Augsburg against France, the Bank
of England grew to become the de facto issuer
of British currency and the country’s central
bank. In addition to its role as the government’s
bank, it became the bankers’ bank and the
keeper of Great Britain’s currency and reserves,
colloquially coined “The Old Lady of Threadneedle Street.” When the British Parliament
officially established the gold standard in 1821,
the Bank of England was required to redeem
all of its notes in gold on demand. In contrast
to today’s “fiat money” system whereby money

78 Against the Grain / December 2011 - January 2012

has value based on government decree and is
intrinsically useless, the Bank of England’s
ability to create money was restricted since
new note issues had to be backed by gold. For
a comprehensive history of gold and its role
as both an economic unit and a mythologized
object of human desire, see financial historian
Peter Bernstein’s The Power of Gold: A History of an Obsession.3 While the Bank of
England performed many public functions, such
as establishing the gold-backed legal tender
and purchasing government bonds, it remained
privately owned. There was an inherent conflict
between its role as a private institution whose
primary constituency was its shareholders and
its public role to promote financial stability.
In a crisis, the key question was whether the
Bank of England would preserve the wealth of
its private shareholders or help rival banks in
order to preserve the public financial system.
The nineteenth century saw frequent, frightening financial crises that intensified this tension.
As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff
chronicle in This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, the United Kingdom
alone experienced banking crises in 1810, 1815,
1825, 1837, 1847, 1857, and 1866.4
These frequent financial crises highlight
how the banking system functions as a concontinued on page 79
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fidence game, not in the traditional sense of a
swindling operation, but in the sense that any
bank’s soundness depends on the belief that a
bank’s depositors and creditors can get their
money at a moment’s notice. Banks borrow
for short periods and lend for long periods,
profiting from the difference in the rate they
pay to depositors and the rate they charge borrowers. Because of this, a modern bank will
typically maintain only about ten percent of its
assets in liquid securities such as United States
Treasuries. For every one dollar in reserves, a
bank has nine dollars on loans to businesses
and individuals. Modern fractional reserve
banking relies on public confidence that a
depositor can obtain funds on a moment’s notice. During a banking crisis, credit contracts
and players seek safety in cash or its nearest
substitute. Historically, this has led to bank runs
— a rush to withdraw cash that depletes banks’
cash reserves, causing banks to fail and credit
markets to freeze. Individuals and institutions
acting rationally in their self-interest can cause
the entire financial system to collapse, and the
crisis becomes catastrophic.
Given the historical frequency of financial
crises, there is much practical, as well as
theoretical evidence to draw from. In Lombard
Street, Bagehot argued that in a financial crisis the Bank of England must “... lend freely,
boldly, and so that the public may feel you
mean to go on lending,” even though “...the
first instinct of everyone is to the contrary.”5
His dictum flies in the face of the most basic
economic survival instinct: preserve capital.
The wisdom of Bagehot’s primary principle
has been repeatedly proven in financial crises
ever since. In the classic work Manias, Panics
and Crashes, first published in 1978 and now in
its sixth edition, economic historian Charles P.
Kindleberger reviews the anatomy of financial
crises and thoroughly explores the concept
of the lender of last resort, determining that
“practice preceded theory.”6 The necessity for
a lender of last resort in a crisis was born from
repeated crises in the nineteenth century: “The
lender of last resort stands ready to halt a run out
of real and illiquid financial assets into money
by making more money available.”7
The Panic of 1907: Lessons Learned from
the Market’s Perfect Storm further illustrates
the necessity of a lender of last resort.8 Authors Bruner and Carr trace the origin of the
1907 crisis to the San Francisco earthquake of
April 18, 1906. The earthquake damage and
subsequent fires created a monumental rebuilding effort that drew gold from the world’s
financial centers and created a liquidity crisis.
The authors argue that this shortage of cash for
transactions and business loans caused a recession that started in June 1907. At the time, the
United States, like other major countries, was
on the gold standard, which limited money
creation. Confidence was further eroded by
Wall Street speculation and fraud. The immediate trigger for the crisis was the failure
of the Knickerbocker Trust Company, one
of the largest banks in the United States. Its
president, Charles T. Barney, had been using
bank funds in an attempt to corner the market
in copper. When the scheme failed, the bank
suffered large losses that caused a bank run and
forced it into bankruptcy. Doubts about the

soundness of other banks and trusts resulted
in anxious depositors lining up to withdraw
funds, causing more failures. The money
market froze, the stock market fell sharply, and
the City of New York almost went bankrupt.
This panic occurred in the National Banking
Era, when the United States did not have a
central bank that could lend freely and halt the
panic. The legendary John Pierpont Morgan
organized a group of leading private bankers
and financiers to put up enough money to stop
the panic, effectively serving as the lender of
last resort. Perhaps ironically, the financial
system in 1907 was saved by an ad hoc group
of wealthy businessmen, and the crisis led to the
establishment of a modern U.S. central bank in
1913 — the Federal Reserve System.
The Great Depression shows what can
happen when the lender of last resort fails to
act forcefully enough. Liaquat Ahamed’s
Lords of Finance: The Bankers Who Broke the
World won the Financial Times “Best Business
Book of the Year” award in 2009.9 Ahamed
recounts how mistakes made by the world’s
leading central bankers — Montagu Norman
of the Bank of England, Émile Moreau of
the Banque de France, Hjalmar Schact of
the Reichsbank, and Benjamin Strong of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York — led the
world’s central banks to inadequately respond
to the Great Depression. Belief in and adherence to the gold standard effectively handcuffed
the central banks. Ahamed notes: “They failed
to fulfill even the most basic central banker’s
responsibility: to act as lender of last resort and
support the banking system at a time of panic.”10
In their economic history of the Depression, The
Great Contraction 1929-1933, Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz
wrote that Bagehot’s Lombard Street was “the
locus classicus of central bank policy.”11 They
conclude that the Federal Reserve could have
greatly lessened the severity of the crisis had it
fully embraced Bagehot’s principle.
However, the lender of last resort doctrine
presents a paradox: if market participants are
confident that the central bank will always
introduce funds into the market during an
economic crisis, then they are more likely to
take on greater risks to generate higher returns,
simultaneously producing the next financial
crisis. Economists call this condition, clearly
illustrated during the recent financial crisis,
“moral hazard.” The Financial Crisis Inquiry
Report explains how the large commercial
and investment banks — Goldman Sachs,
JP Morgan, Merrill Lynch, Bear Stearns,
Lehman Brothers, Citi, et al. — engineered
the highly profitable mortgage-backed securities and their derivatives that fueled the housing
boom, only to become toxic and poison the
international financial system when the housing market collapsed in 2007 and many of the
securities became worthless.12 Yet today, banks
“too big to fail” are even bigger and the top
executives are earning record bonuses while
the global economy continues struggling to
emerge from the worst recession since the
Great Depression.
Bagehot’s principle that the central bank
must lend freely in a financial crisis is the key
to understanding how the Federal Reserve
responded to the current economic conditions.
As Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke
noted in a 2008 speech given at the height
of the crisis, “Walter Bagehot’s Lombard
continued on page 80
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Street, published in 1873, remains one of the
classic treatments of the role of the central bank
in the management of financial crises.”13 As a
scholar of the Great Depression, Bernanke was
determined to maintain the flow of credit in the
United States and also internationally. Perry
Mehrling points out in The New Lombard Street
just how far the Fed has pushed the lender of
last resort principle to save the international
financial system by extending credit to money
market funds, the commercial paper market,
asset-backed securities, and even by purchasing
mortgage-backed securities to prevent a total
collapse of the housing market.14 The crisis has
forced the Fed to become a market maker or, as
Mehrling argues, “The Dealer of Last Resort.”
The lasting influence of Bagehot’s Lombard
Street is clear. It continues to inform economic
policy and theory and is a classic, yet ever-current
work for a library collection covering economics. This and the other works discussed here
offer finance and business students important
scholarly perspectives on past, present, and the
almost-certain future financial crises.
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Issues in Vendor/Library
Relations — FOTB Tallahassee
Column Editor: Bob Nardini (Group Director, Client Integration and Head
Bibliographer, Coutts Information Services) <bnardini@couttsinfo.com>

W

hen a call went out earlier this year
inviting registrations, sponsorships, and papers for a conference
called “Future of the Book,” in no time most
of the back-and-forth email messages settling
the details had shorthanded that down to
“FOTB.” Some acronyms are just naturals.
FOTB sounded like a few others already in
circulation, and it stuck.
FOTB took place in Tallahassee, Florida,
which might not seem like a place where
you could work out the book’s future. It’s
the state capital, but who thinks about “Tallahassee,” unblessed as it is by beaches or by
Disney attractions, when Florida comes up
in conversation? Who considers Tallahassee
the jewel even of the Florida Panhandle, the
long, narrow strip of northwest Florida that
runs west into Mobile, Alabama, and the
site of sunny destinations like Pensacola and
Panama City? Tallahassee, instead, is the inland anchor of the Panhandle’s less-traveled
eastern stem. A friend who years ago went
to grad school there used to describe the city
as “one-third bureaucrats, one-third students,
and one-third rednecks.”
Funny, but unfair. Tallahassee might
surprise you. I had a good time at FOTB.
One night we had a nice dinner downtown
at the Mockingbird Café, whose waitress
took loving care of us as we enjoyed a
good live band and a menu where entrees
started at Sauteed Grouper and ended at
Tandoori Cornish Game Hen. The next day
I wandered into an independent bookstore
— the city has several — and came out with
two books, both published by Tallahassee’s
Anhinga Press. Anhinga, starting in the
1970s with local chapbooks, has made a go
of poetry ever since. Among its laurels is the
annual publication since 2001 of the Levine
Poetry Prize book — Philip Levine named
a short time ago as the United States Poet
Laureate. A memorable line in one of my
Anhinga books is the opening stanza from a
poem about the convergence of tabloid and
mainstream culture, “Denver Man Shot by
Golden Retriever.”
America runs fictional these days,
my mama says.
FOTB was held at Tallahassee’s best
known university, Florida State (the city is
also home to Florida A&M and Tallahassee
Community College), an institution best
known for its football team, the Seminoles.
FSU might surprise you too, though. At the
library school, emeritus professor Wayne
Wiegand is the principal biographer of Melvil Dewey. The English Department houses
a number of luminaries, most prominently
Robert Olen Butler, winner of a Pulitzer
Prize for fiction, and also one of my favorite
poets, Barbara Hamby (who did not write
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the poem above, which can instead be found
in Yellowjackets, by Patti White). There’s
an interdisciplinary program at FSU called
History of Text Technologies (HoTT),
whose range is “cave paintings to personal
computers,” with courses for graduate and
undergraduate students to study anything
from “ a twelfth-century lyric poet and romancer within the context of the troubadour
and romance traditions,” to the “biopolitics
of postcolonial mobile phone networks,” with
quite a lot of other ground covered in between
this pair of historical moments, as platforms
for reading, writing, and communicating
have succeeded and superseded, collided
and co-existed with one another across the
millennia.
The point is that Tallahassee is more than
a place where famous football players like
Deion Sanders learn their trade. It is also
home to the people who make up a vibrant
local book community. Since our best clues
to the future of the book will have to come
from the present of the book, why not Tallahassee?
For two days the present-day book was
well represented across the thirty presentations comprising the FOTB program about
the book’s future. Academic librarians had
their say. So did deans, scholars, and students. Publishers stood up, also booksellers
and novelists. Consultants spoke. Futurists
and technologists looked ahead from their
seats for the benefit of the one hundred or so
conference attendees. Current library technical services issues were one window into the
future. Today’s eBooks were of course more
frequently called upon as a way to divine
what’s ahead. E-readers, artist books, textbooks, children’s books, and books of other
kinds all were examined too.
However FOTB was bookended, so to
speak, by two talks which mapped the poles
representing what probably amount to the
most and least embracing attitudes you could
possibly express at an academic conference
today, on the notion that the book as we have
known it is going away soon if not in some
ways already gone. The coordinates of everyone else were somewhere between those
of two “featured speakers” at FOTB, Elaine
Treharne and Bob Stein.
A professor in the English department
and also active in FSU’s HoTT program,
Treharne spoke early on day one. She specializes in medieval manuscripts and book
history and has the kind of scholarly record
that gets one invited to become a Fellow of
the Royal Historical Society, which had
happened to her not long before FOTB. At
the podium she switched between the learned
manner one would expect from a distincontinued on page 81
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